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ABSTRACT 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has long been 
controversial. It allows the government to take private property for the 
purpose of “public use.” But what does public use mean? The definition is 
one of judicial interpretation. It has evolved from the original meaning 
intended by the drafters of the Constitution. Now, the meaning is 
extremely broad. This Note argues that both the original and contemporary 
meaning of public use are problematic. It explores the issues with both 
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The debate over the scope and limits of eminent domain is as old as 
the Magna Carta. In drafting the United States Constitution, Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison debated whether the government should 
have any authority to seize private property: Jefferson said no, whereas 
Madison said yes but with restrictions.1 Ultimately, Madison’s more 
moderate view prevailed, and he incorporated the restrictions in what is 
known as the “Takings Clause” in the Fifth Amendment.2 This portion of 
the Fifth Amendment provides that “private property shall not be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”3 However, as an Illinois appellate 
court once noted, “[w]hat constitutes a ‘public purpose’ . . . has plagued 
the American judiciary ever since it arrogated to itself the prerogative of 
interpreting constitutions.”4 
The debate surrounding the drafting of the Takings Clause is 
evidence that the Founding Fathers did not recognize the government’s 
power to seize property but instead sought to limit it.5 The problem is that 
quite the opposite has happened. Federal courts have considerably 
broadened the definition of “public use,”6 which was originally intended 
to limit sovereign takings.7 Now, virtually any benefit bestowed by a 
taking may constitute a “public purpose.”8 This Note focuses on the 
meaning of public use in federal case law—the parameters of which have 
become controversial in the wake of the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Kelo v. City of New London. 
 
 
 1. Bruce L. Benson, The Evolution of Eminent Domain: A Remedy for Market Failure or an 
Effort to Limit Government Power and Government Failure?, 12 INDEP. REV. 423, 429–30 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 430. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4. Lake Louise Improvement Ass’n v. Multimedia Cablevision of Oak Lawn, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 
982, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
 5. See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 524 (2009). 
 6. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). 
 7. See Bell, supra note 5. 
 8. ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 35 (2015). 
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In general, two schools of thought exist with regard to the scope of 
public use. The narrow interpretation, taken by many constitutional 
originalists, views property rights as fundamental rights afforded 
constitutional protection.9 Under the narrow view, property rights are 
considered so fundamental that they should only be taken away if the 
government uses the property or if the property is available to the public.10 
This narrow interpretation requires condemned property to either be used 
by the government or made available as a public utility.11 On the other 
hand, living constitutionalists endorse a broader view of public use.  
These scholars believe that the public use requirement for a taking is 
satisfied by projects that generally benefit the public, even if the public 
cannot actively access or use the space.12 This Note contends that both 
interpretations are flawed. 
If the original intent of the drafters of the Constitution was to protect 
citizens from government takings that are not absolutely necessary, then 
both the narrow and broad interpretations of public use are unsuccessful 
in doing so. The narrow interpretation is underinclusive and fails to 
provide for certain public uses that should justify a taking. The broad 
interpretation has strayed too far from the intended purpose of the Fifth 
Amendment by allowing condemnations for economic development and 
blight reduction that confer benefits on private parties.13 This Note 
proposes a new, hybrid test that recognizes the worthwhile aspects of each 
interpretation but remains flexible. 
The proposal is a federal law that continues to focus on protecting 
private property in accordance with both the drafters’ intent and the narrow 
interpretation but adds new elements informed by common themes in 
contemporary state case law. Further, to avoid the issues resulting from a 
broad interpretation, the proposed test also includes some limitations taken 
from state statutes, constitutions, and common law. The proposed test pulls 
 
 9. Ilya Somin, Debating the Original Meaning of “Public Use,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY  
(Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/27/debating-
the-original-meaning-of-public-use/ [https://perma.cc/4VMP-YRF7] (explaining the differing views 
of constitutional originalists and living constitutionalists). 
 10. Matthew J. Parlow, Unintended Consequences: Eminent Domain and Affordable Housing, 
46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 850 (2006). 
 11. Somin, supra note 9. 
 12. Parlow, supra note 10, at 851. 
 13. “Blight” is defined by each jurisdiction, but in essence, it refers to an area that is 
deteriorating, consequentially making it useless and in the process of becoming a slum. Jonathan M. 
Purver, Annotation, What Constitutes “Blighted Area” Within Urban Renewal and Redevelopment 
Statutes, 45 A.L.R.3d 1096 § 3 (1972) (discussing a “blighted area” as expansively construed); see 
also Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
2100, 2101–02 (2009).  
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language from state laws because states provide original and creative 
limitations on takings. State legislatures are free to impose strict 
limitations on takings and state courts are free to adopt stringent tests for 
establishing a public use. Finally, because the meaning of public use will 
necessarily evolve over time, the test is meant to serve as a baseline  
that state legislatures and federal courts may continue to build upon  
as new issues arise. 
Part I of this Note explains the historical background of the Takings 
Clause. This part also summarizes how takings are administered at the 
state level and how current law permits delegation to municipalities. 
Further, Part I discusses the development of federal law and the departure 
from the original purpose of the Takings Clause that culminated in the 
controversial U.S. Supreme Court case Kelo. Part II considers the Kelo 
case itself as well as the different rationales offered by the Court’s majority 
and dissenting opinions. Part III explores the legislative and judicial 
developments post-Kelo with particular emphasis on how the broad and 
narrow interpretations of public use mesh with the modern trend of using 
eminent domain to promote affordable housing developments. Part IV 
surveys how state courts have interpreted public use in the wake of Kelo, 
identifying common themes and innovative approaches. Finally, in light 
of post-Kelo jurisprudence, Part V proposes a new federal test for 
understanding public use that, as previously mentioned, attempts to 
remedy deficiencies in both broad and narrow interpretations. 
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
a. The Framers’ Intent 
Madison first drafted the Takings Clause to read: “[n]o person shall 
be . . . obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for 
public use, without just compensation.”14 While evidence of a debate 
among the drafters surrounding the scope of government’s power to seize 
property exists,15 there does not appear to be any evidence of a debate 
surrounding the restrictions enumerated in the clause as it was adopted.16 
Nevertheless, scholars have inferred Madison’s intent based on historical 
context. In a time when relinquishing property to the Crown was common 
in England, the original language of the clause suggests Madison’s focus 
 
 14. JAMES MADISON, Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789, in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 196, 207 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). 
 15. Benson, supra note 1. 
 16. See id. at 430. 
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was on protecting citizens from the government.17 If that is the case, then 
the Takings Clause was drafted to reflect “a congruence of concerns 
relating to the perceived need to protect particular forms of real property 
from state seizure.”18 Further, the original language compared to the 
adopted language reveals Madison’s focus on the direct physical  
seizure of property—an issue debated today in light of controversial 
regulatory takings.19 
Even before Madison presented the Bill of Rights to Congress, his 
understanding of property rights was heavily influenced both by the work 
of the English scholars who preceded him and the other drafters of the 
Constitution. For example, King John of England first introduced the due 
process requirement to the Takings Clause in the Magna Carta 
Libertatum.20 It states that “[n]o freeman shall be seized or imprisoned, or 
stripped of his rights or possessions[.]”21 
Madison also would have likely been aware of Sir William 
Blackstone’s four-volume series titled the Commentaries on the Laws of 
England and published in the mid-eighteenth century. In this series, 
Blackstone recognized the individual right to property. He stated: 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination and 
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any 
individual in the universe.22 
Finally, in John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, he defined 
political power as the right to make laws for the protection and regulation 
 
 17. Madison’s emphasis on direct takings was spelled out in his National Gazette piece. James 
Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, March 29, 1792, at 174–75. He stated:  
If there be a government then which prides itself in maintaining the inviolability of 
property; which provides that none shall be taken directly even for public use without 
indemnification to the owner, and yet directly violates the property which individuals have 
in their opinions, their religion, their persons, and their faculties; nay more, which 
indirectly violates their property, in their actual possessions . . . .  
James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, at 175. 
 18. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, GEO. ENVT’L 
L. & POL’Y INST. PAPERS & REPS. 2, 6 (1998) (discussing how the original language demonstrates a 
focus on physical seizures). 
 19. Id. at 2. Regulatory takings occur when the government prevents a landowner via regulation 
from making a particular use of property that would otherwise be permissible. Forest Properties, Inc. 
v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1014 (1992)). 
 20. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 358 (2015). 
 21. KING JOHN OF ENGLAND, MAGNA CARTA 1215 (British Libr. Trans., 2014) (clause 39). 
 22. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.  
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of property.23 Locke argued that in the absence of laws humans have a duty 
to protect one another, but people generally accept laws because they are 
ultimately for the benefit of the public.24 Taken together, these works 
provide a basis for understanding property rights in relation to the 
government and public interest. In essence, Madison likely wished to 
recognize an individual’s right to property as fundamental, meaning that a 
property owners should not be required to relinquish their rights to 
property.25 At the same time, he likely understood the government’s 
inherent power to take or regulate property in the interest of the public 
good.26 Thus, based on this understanding of property rights at the time the 
Takings Clause was drafted, Madison probably intended for public use to 
have a very limited scope; hence why Constitutional Originalists’ 
interpretation of public use is narrow. 
b. The Administration of Eminent Domain 
Eminent domain is defined as “[t]he inherent power of a 
governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp[ecially] land, 
and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the 
taking.”27 What would otherwise be an almost unrestrained power of 
federal and state government to take private property is limited by 
constitutional clauses such as the Fifth Amendment.28 Although the 
drafters debated making this power explicit in the Constitution, the 
government’s taking power remains inherent.29 This power can be inferred 
from other clauses in the Constitution, such as Article I, Section 8, which 
gives states the authority to take property to build “forts, magazines, 
arsenals [and] dockyards” with the consent of the legislature of the state 
in which the property is located.30 
Before the Supreme Court incorporated the Takings Clause into the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process provision, federal courts did not 
restrain states from exercising eminent domain powers to take private 
 
 23. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 195 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690). 
 24. Id. at 197. 
 25. See generally James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, at 174–75 
(describing the application of the term “property” and the government’s relation to property). 
 26. See Benson, supra note 1, at 428–29. 
 27. Mayor of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 335 (Md. 2007) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 28. 17 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & JOHN W. WEAVER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES, REAL 
ESTATE: PROPERTY LAW § 9.1 (2d ed. 2020). 
 29. William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 560 
(1972). 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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property.31 Now, the recognized limitations on a state’s condemnation 
power come from state constitutions that often reflect the Fifth 
Amendment or state legislation.32 Additionally, federal courts are free to 
review state takings.33 
States have the power to condemn, but they may delegate that power 
through statutes to governmental and certain quasi-governmental 
creatures, such as counties, cities, special districts, and public-utility 
corporations.34 Thus, it is possible for eminent domain to occur where the 
state or municipality itself may not be a party to the action. However, “[a] 
governmental body subordinate to the state . . . may not exercise, create, 
extend or expand a power of eminent domain in the absence of statutory 
authority.”35 “Statutes delegating the right of eminent domain are strictly 
construed by the courts.”36 
c. Development of Fifth Amendment Interpretation 
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the federal 
government’s power to take private property in 1875 when it allowed the 
Secretary of the Treasury to take private property for the construction of a 
post office.37 Because the Constitution does not explicitly grant 
condemnation powers to the federal government, all condemnations prior 
to this case were conducted through the states’ power to condemn 
enumerated in Article I, Section 8.38 Although the government has an 
inherent power to take property, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
explicitly grants state legislatures the power to decide what constitutes a 
public use by defining them in statutes. However, because the Supreme 
Court—in Kohl v. United States—recognized the federal government’s 
inherent power to condemn, the federal government no longer needs to use 
the state’s Article I power for takings. Thus, Kohl effectively eliminated 
limitations on the federal government’s condemnations.39 
Next, the Court’s decision in Berman v. Parker blurred the 
distinction between “public interest,” “public welfare,” and “public 
 
 31. Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1132 (Ohio 2006). 
 32. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 33. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1132. 
 34. STOEBUCK, supra note 28, at § 9.3. 
 35. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cnty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 646 (Okla. 2006). 
 36. City of Smithville v. St. Luke’s Northland Hosp. Corp., 972 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 37. See generally Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). 
 38. Benson, supra note 1, at 429. 
 39. Id. 
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purpose” when defining public use.40 In 1954, department store owners 
challenged the constitutionality of the Redevelopment Act.41 In the Act, 
the state legislature gave the Redevelopment Land Agency the ability to 
seize property to redevelop blighted areas.42 Ultimately, the Court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ claims, affirming the lower court’s decision that it was 
within the legislative branch’s discretion to decide that reducing aesthetics 
and health issues caused by blighted areas was a public use.43 By using the 
terms public use and public purpose interchangeably, Justice William O. 
Douglas, in the majority opinion, established that the public use 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment was satisfied if the use of property 
would further some public purpose or generally promote welfare—a far 
less stringent standard than requiring that the public have access to and use 
the property.44 Additionally, he noted that the “role of the judiciary in 
determining whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is 
an extremely narrow one.”45 Thus, through Justice Douglas’s opinion, the 
Court also gave broad judicial deference to the legislature.46 
In 1984, the Court further expanded its understanding of public use 
in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff by concluding that the government 
itself does not have to use the property to legitimize the taking because the 
public use test is one of purpose, not mechanics.47 As elucidated by this 
case, “the mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is 
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn 
that taking as having only a private purpose.”48 Essentially, the Court 
reasoned that the fact that the property is conveyed to a private owner does 
not mean that the taking has no public use.49 Thus, after the Court decided 
Midkiff, the government was no longer required to use the property it 
condemned, but instead, the government could take private property if it 
would generally serve a public purpose. 
 
 40. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (comparing “public welfare” and “public 
purpose”). 
 41. Id. at 28. 
 42. Id. at 29. 
 43. Id. at 35–36. 
 44. Brent Nicholson & Sue Ann Mota, From Public Use to Public Purpose: The Supreme Court 
Stretches the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 81, 88 (2005). 
 45. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984). 
 48. Id. at 243. 
 49. Id. at 243–44. 
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II. THE BEGINNING OF THE END: KELO V. NEW LONDON 
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided Kelo.50 This 
holding represents an extreme departure from the original purpose of the 
Takings Clause. In this case, the Court applied such an expansive 
understanding of public use that it effectively neutered the essential 
requirement in the Takings Clause: That a taking must be for public use. 
In 2000, the city of New London, Connecticut, approved an 
economic development plan projected to create over 1,000 jobs in order to 
“increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically 
distressed city.”51 Subsequently, the city’s development agent successfully 
negotiated with most property owners and bought all but ten residences 
and five other properties needed to implement its plan.52 Consequently, the 
agent tried to invoke eminent domain to acquire the remaining properties, 
none of which were alleged to be “blighted or otherwise in poor 
condition.”53 In response, the property owners brought an action claiming 
these takings violated the public use restriction, and they urged the Court 
to adopt a bright-line rule precluding economic development from 
potential public uses.54 The key question was voiced by Justice Scalia 
during oral argument when he stated, “It is quite different to say you can 
give [a property] to a private individual simply because that private 
individual is going to hire more people and pay more taxes. That 
[understanding] . . . just washes out entirely the distinction between 
private use and public use.”55 
In a 5–4 decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
takings for the purpose of economic development and refused to second-
guess the city’s considered judgment as to the development plan.56 The 
Court relied heavily on Berman and Midkiff in its reasoning. It emphasized 
the need to maintain the Court’s “policy of deference to legislative 
judgment in this field,” and it did not require the city to provide evidence 
of the public purpose.57 It also rejected any suggestion that it should 
 
 50. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 51. Id. at 472. 
 52. Id. at 475. 
 53. Id.; see discussion infra Section III.b and note 13 (defining blight). 
 54. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481. 
 55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53–54, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
(No. 04-108). 
 56. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488–89. For an analysis of the Court’s erroneous reliance on the  
Lochner-era due process cases, see Ilya Somin, Justice Stevens Admits Error in the Kelo Case–But 
Also Doubles Down on the Bottom Line, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 8, 2019), https://reason.com/ 
2019/06/08/justice-stevens-admits-error-in-the-kelo-case-but-also-doubles-down-on-the-bottom-line/ 
[https://perma.cc/C3U9-59XL]. 
 57. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480. 
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formulate a more rigorous test but acknowledged that a state was still free 
to place further restrictions on exercising the state’s takings power.58 
In Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, he emphasized the importance of 
judicial review for determining a public use.59 Although Justice Kennedy 
agreed with the majority in rejecting a presumption of invalidity  
for economic development, he acknowledged that a “more stringent 
standard of review . . . might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn 
category of takings.”60 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, 
dissented, explaining that, prior to this case, the Court had generally 
identified three categories of takings in compliance with the public use 
requirement: (1) sovereign transfers of private property to public 
ownership, such as roads, hospitals, or military bases; (2) sovereign 
transfers to private parties who make the property available for the public’s 
use, such as railroads, public utilities, or stadiums; and (3) takings that 
serve a public purpose.61 Further, Justice O’Connor concluded that 
economic development did not meet the public purpose requirement in any 
of these categories.62 She distinguished this case from both Berman and 
Midkiff, in which legislative bodies had found that the elimination of the 
existing property use was necessary to remedy a harm.63 Thus, in those 
cases, it did not matter that the property was turned over to private use 
because the public purpose was realized when the harmful use was 
eliminated.64 She criticized the majority in Kelo for expanding the 
meaning of public use and permitting a taking for “ordinary private use, 
so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for 
the public.”65 Justice O’Connor explained that expansion of the definition 







 58. Id. at 489 (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”). 
 59. Id. at 490–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 493. 
 61. Id. at 497-98 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). “Public ownership” meaning a property owned by 
the public. “Use-by-the-public” meaning that the public is permitted to use the property. 
 62. Id. at 497. 
 63. Id. at 500. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 501. 
 66. Id. at 494. 
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Finally, in Justice Thomas’s dissent, he espoused a narrow 
interpretation of public use, stating that “it is ‘imperative that the Court 
maintain absolute fidelity to’ the [Public Use] Clause’s express limit on 
the power of the government over the individual.”67 Thomas argued for 
adherence to the plain language of the Public Use Clause by discussing the 
history and original meaning of public use.68 He further declined to justify 
“insurmountable deference to legislative conclusions that a use serves a 
‘public use’” because it is unlikely that the Framers intended to completely 
defer to legislatures, and additionally, the Court does not do so in other 
circumstances of constitutional interpretation.69 In the end, New London 
acquired Susette Kelo’s property but never developed it.70 Today, her 
home sits blighted.71 
III. POST-KELO ISSUES UNDER THE BROAD AND NARROW 
INTERPRETATION 
a. Backlash to the Broad Interpretation 
Since Kelo, economic development has been considered a valid 
public use within the meaning of the Takings Clause, so long as its actual 
effect is not to bestow a private benefit to a single private property owner.72 
Thus, condemnations for economic purposes may be legitimatized by a 
development plan of some kind.73 After Kelo was decided, lawmakers 
immediately recognized the potentially dangerous implications from its 
holding. These dangers sparked an enormous political backlash at both the 
state and federal level. The response to Kelo created more new state 
legislation than any other Supreme Court decision in history—even 
surpassing Furman v. Georgia.74 After Furman, thirty-five states passed 
 
 67. Id. at 507 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
 68. Id. at 517. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The Cato Institute, The Kelo Decision Ten Years Later, YOUTUBE (June 23, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zswtTQaFuE [https://perma.cc/L2AD-R3AQ]. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Somin, supra note 9. 
 73. Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings 
and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 623, 630 (2006). 
 74. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (holding that the death penalty is a 
cruel and unusual punishment and violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). For a 
comprehensive analysis of the effective and ineffective legislative reforms post-Kelo, see Somin, 
supra note 13, at 2102. 
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new death penalty statutes.75 In the first three years after Kelo was decided, 
forty-three states passed laws or amended their constitutions to explicitly 
ban economic development as a public use.76 The U.S. House of 
Representatives also immediately passed a resolution denouncing Kelo 
and placed a limitation on eminent domain power.77 In total, forty-five 
states enacted reforms in the ten years after Kelo, and polls showed that 
80% of the public disapproved of the ruling.78 
For example, Texas’s amended Constitution now states that “‘public 
use’ does not include the taking of property. . . for transfer to a private 
entity for the primary purpose of economic development or enhancement 
of tax revenues.”79 Additionally, Chapter 2 of the Pennsylvania Code 
specifically enumerates limitations and exceptions of eminent domain, 
stating that “[e]xcept as set forth in subsection (b), the exercise by any 
condemnor of the power of eminent domain to take private property in 
order to use it for private enterprise is prohibited.”80 Subsection (b) 
provides an extensive list of exceptions.81 Unfortunately, not all post-Kelo 
reforms successfully addressed the problem created by the Court’s holding 
and the broad interpretation of public use. 
b. Blight Condemnations Under the Broad Interpretation 
For instance, in an attempt to avoid private-to-private takings, many 
states enacted legislation prohibiting takings for private economic 
 
 75. Evan J. Mandery, It’s Been 40 Years Since the Supreme Court Tried to Fix the Death 
Penalty–Here’s How It Failed, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.themarshall 
project.org/2016/03/30/it-s-been-40-years-since-the-supreme-court-tried-to-fix-the-death-penalty-
here-s-why-it-failed [https://perma.cc/6WS5-GNEY]. 
 76. See Somin, supra note 13, at 2102. 
 77. See generally H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted). 
 78. Ilya Somin, The Political and Judicial Reaction to Kelo, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 4, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/04/the-political-and-
judicial-reaction-to-kelo/ [https://perma.cc/Y5HK-2YGA]. 
 79. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(b). 
 80. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 204(a) (2006). 
 81. Id. at (b) (including, for example, “(2) The property is taken by, to the extent the party has 
the power of eminent domain, transferred or leased to any of the following: (i) A public utility or 
railroad as defined in 66 Pa.C.S. § 102 (relating to definitions). (ii) A common carrier. (iii) A private 
enterprise that occupies an incidental area within a public project, such as retail space, office space, 
restaurant and food service facility or similar incidental area. (3) There is, on or associated with the 
property taken, a threat to public health or safety. This paragraph includes the following: (i) Removal 
of a public nuisance. (ii) Removal of a structure which is: (A) beyond repair; or (B) unfit for human 
habitation or use. . . . (4) The property taken is abandoned. (5) The property taken meets the 
requirements of section 205 (relating to blight). (6) The property taken is acquired by a condemnor 
pursuant to section 12.1 of the act of May 24, 1945 (P.L.991, No.385), known as the Urban 
Redevelopment Law. (7) The property taken is acquired for the development of low-income and 
mixed-income housing projects pursuant to the act of May 28, 1937 (P.L.955, No.265), known as the 
Housing Authorities Law, or to be developed using financial incentives available for the development 
of low-income and mixed-income housing projects”). 
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development. Private-to-private takings occur when a private property is 
taken under the guise of eminent domain but is transferred to a private 
party for a private purpose.82 Although private-to-private takings  
were prohibited, state legislatures simultaneously allowed takings for  
“almost any area where economic development could potentially  
be increased,” thereby creating a special exception that allowed  
for blight condemnations.83 
For example, Illinois’s municipal code permits acquisition of a slum 
or blighted area for the “elimination and for the prevention of the 
development or spread of slums and blight and may involve slum 
clearance and redevelopment in a Slum and Blighted Area Redevelopment 
Project.”84 In Kelo, eliminating blight was one of the justifications for the 
economic development plan.85 Under this line of reasoning, allowing 
condemnations to reduce blight provides an avenue for permissibly taking 
private property for private economic use. Therefore, some statutes, touted 
as reforms to combat the broad interpretation of public use, are ineffective 
because they still allow takings for private development. 
c. Affordable Housing 
In addition to reforms still allowing private-to-private takings, the 
broad definition of public use is problematic in other ways, such as its 
marginalization of issues like affordable housing. Cities that invoke the 
acute need for affordable housing in order to justify private-to-private 
takings have received pushback from those on both sides of the debate.86 
Those who hold a narrow view recognize that government entities can 
easily acquire property to construct affordable housing units, but this 
interpretation prohibits government entities from transferring the 
properties to private developers, who arguably could construct and operate 
these properties more efficiently and effectively.87 On the other hand, 
affordable housing certainly constitutes a public use under the broad 
interpretation but so does other economic development.88 With the broader 
 
 82. See United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cnty., 547 F.3d 943, 952 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 83. Somin, supra note 13, at 2121. 
 84. 315 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3(j) (2006) (defining a blighted area as “any area of not less in the 
aggregate than 2 acres located within the territorial limits of a municipality where buildings or 
improvements, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, 
lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use or layout 
or any combination of these factors, are detrimental to the public safety, health, morals or welfare”). 
 85. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005). 
 86. Parlow, supra note 10, at 851–52. 
 87. Id. at 852. 
 88. Id. at 852–53. 
162 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:149 
definition of public use, cities will likely use their condemnation power to 
build projects that generate more property or tax revenue than affordable 
housing.89 Thus, cities in need of affordable housing may use eminent 
domain to acquire land, but the narrow interpretation would make 
operation inefficient and the broad definition arguably incentivizes the use 
of eminent domain for other more fiscally attractive projects. 
Eminent domain is regularly used as a method to improve 
communities and remedy problems arising in growing metropolitan areas. 
For example, in increasingly expensive cities, such as New York, Seattle, 
and San Francisco, the need for affordable housing is growing as homeless 
populations increase.90 In 2017, the Mayor of New York City, Bill de 
Blasio, proposed a solution to the homelessness crisis by using eminent 
domain to acquire twenty-five to thirty privately owned buildings to create 
affordable housing.91 Even though de Blasio reasoned that “[a]ddressing 
the homelessness is a fundamental public good,” eminent domain was 
ultimately not necessary for the project because negotiations with the 
landowners were successful.92 
Seattle took a slightly different tack. In March 2019, the Seattle City 
Council passed mandatory affordable housing requirements 
accompanying the upzoning93 of twenty-seven neighborhoods.94 The city 
will likely need to use eminent domain to create government-implemented 
affordable housing units in these newly upzoned neighborhoods. 
Affordable housing is an important issue in growing cities, and eminent 
domain remains a potential avenue for assisting in land acquisitions. 
 
 89. Id. at 853. 
 90. See Emily Badger, Happy New Year! May Your City Never Become San Francisco, New 
York or Seattle, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/upshot/happy-
new-year-may-your-city-never-become-san-francisco-new-york-or-seattle.html [https://perma.cc/7N 
4Y-4UMJ]. 
 91. Bill de Blasio, Mayor of N.Y.C., Mayor de Blasio Announces Move to Convert Cluster 
Buildings into Permanent Affordable Housing for Homeless Families (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/758-17/transcript-mayor-de-blasio-move-convert-
cluster-buildings-permanent-affordable [https://perma.cc/4S86-YXHY]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Upzoning occurs when areas are rezoned to allow for higher use, such as changing a 
residential zone to a commercial one or a commercial zone to an industrial one. See 3 DWIGHT H. 
MERRIAM & SARA C. BRONIN, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 38:12 (4th ed. 
2020) (upzoning amendments). 
 94. Daniel Beekman, Seattle Upzones 27 Neighborhood Hubs, Passes Affordable-Housing 
Requirements, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/ 
seattle-upzones-27-neighborhood-hubs-passes-affordable-housing-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/P 
Z8R-8BH6]. 
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IV. STATE CASE LAW 
The broad definition of public use defined in Kelo serves as a 
baseline for state legislatures and courts to limit sovereign takings. Since 
2005, states have added limitations to proving a public use through 
constitutions, statutes, and case law. Although almost every state enacted 
a statute in response to Kelo, questions for state courts arising from 
eminent domain challenges inevitably still exist. Common themes have 
emerged among states that were tasked with determining a public use 
definition and meaning post-Kelo. Part V is a survey of contemporary 
eminent domain issues, which highlight some unique state statutes and 
generally demonstrate a common focus: protection of property owners. 
To start, it is important to understand how eminent domain case law 
works. State legislatures define specific public uses in statutes and place 
limitations on the “creatures of government” in constitutions. However, 
the presumption of a public use enumerated in a state law is rebuttable if 
parties can prove that a taking is clearly and palpably of a private character. 
On the other hand, an acceptable public use, even in the hands of a private 
actor, may still exist if the use is of a public character. Therefore, 
subsequent conveyances to private parties are not per se impermissible. 
Further, courts may find that the character of a taking is still for a public 
use when the public merely has a right to access it or even if an incidental 
private benefit exists. 
a. A Survey of Common Themes and Examples of Contemporary Issues 
In the first few years following Kelo, Ohio, Oklahoma, Maryland, 
and the District of Columbia were the first supreme courts tasked with 
addressing eminent domain issues. These state courts distinguished 
between taking particular properties for general “economic 
development”—which, like the plan in Kelo, could provide a public 
benefit through tax revenues, jobs, or blight reduction—and larger plans 
in the furtherance of genuine urban renewal.95 For the most part, state 
courts appear to have found ways to protect property owners by 
distinguishing from Kelo. 
 
 
 95. See generally, e.g., Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006); Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs of Muskogee Cnty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639 (Okla. 2006); Mayor of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 
916 A.2d 324 (Md. 2007). 
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Norwood v. Horney was the first state supreme court case decided 
after Kelo.96 The Ohio Supreme Court held that the economic benefit from 
a redevelopment did not satisfy the public use requirement in the state 
constitution.97 In this case, a struggling city entered into a contract to 
redevelop a neighborhood.98 The private company planned to build 200 
apartments or condominiums, over 500,000 square feet of office and retail 
space, and two public parking facilities.99 The court acknowledged that, 
although “there is merit in the notion that deference must be paid to a 
government’s determination that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
taking[,]” defining a public use is still a judicial question.100 The court 
agreed with Justice O’Connor’s dissent, which explained that a state is not 
permitted to take an individual’s property solely for economic gain.101 
Thus, although economic factors may be considered in determining 
whether private property may be appropriated, an economic benefit to the 
community, standing alone, did not satisfy the public use requirement.102 
In another case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma denied Muskogee 
County’s attempt to take property for the installation of three pipelines.103 
Two of the three proposed pipelines would only serve a privately owned 
electric generation plant.104 The third pipeline was intended to serve new 
residents and enhance water service to current residents.105 In this case, the 
county (a municipality) was attempting to invoke eminent domain, so the 
court’s analysis was limited to a strict statutory construction of the 
Oklahoma law.106 A county’s power to condemn property comes from a 
statute conferring the state’s power to condemn. As noted above, these 





 96. David L. Callies & Christina N. Wakayama, Public Use/Public Purpose After Kelo v. City 




 97. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1123. 
 98. Id. at 1124. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1136–37. 
 101. Id. at 1140. 
 102. Id. at 1140–41. 
 103. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cnty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 652–53  
(Okla. 2006). 
 104. Id. at 642. 
 105. Id. at 643. 
 106. Id. at 646. 
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Additionally, Oklahoma precedent required the court to construe 
constitutional eminent domain provisions “strictly in favor of the owner 
and against the condemning party.”107 The court rejected the county’s 
contention that the third pipeline would serve a public purpose by 
enhancing economic development through the “[increase of] taxes, jobs 
and public and private investment.”108 Instead, the court reasoned that 
municipalities did not have unrestrained discretion to condemn property 
for economic development outside the purposes enumerated in statutory 
schemes, which, in Oklahoma, is limited to blight removal.109 Thus, 
economic development alone did not constitute a public purpose sufficient 
to justify the takings.110 The transfer of private property to a private party, 
in the absence of blight, was not a permissible taking for a municipality.111 
In 2007, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that unlike 
the plaintiffs in Kelo, the plaintiff in Franco v. National Capital 
Revitalization Corp. adequately pled a pretextual defense.112 He argued 
that the sole objective of the acquisition at issue was to build a new 
shopping center.113 Although the court did not decide the case on its merits 
(it remanded the case), it provided guidance on the meaning of “pretext”114 
and noted that the most determinative factor in Kelo was whether a plan 
“unquestionably served a public purpose.”115 
That same year, the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied a taking 
for the purpose of economic development—despite its permissibility 
under state law—because the City of Baltimore did not adequately prove 
that public interest required immediate possession of a specific property.116 
Although Maryland law recognized economic development as a public 
purpose when implemented as part of an urban renewal plan, a quick-take 
condemnation117 required the city to provide justification proving that the 
 
 107. Id. (citing Stinchcomb v. Oklahoma City, 198 P. 508, 508 (First Syllabus by the Court) 
(Okla. 1921)). 
 108. Id. at 648. 
 109. Id. at 650. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Franco v. Nat’l Cap. Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 171–72 (D.C. 2007). 
 113. See id. at 171. 
 114. Id. at 172. 
 115. Id. at 173–75 (“We conclude that a reviewing court must focus primarily on benefits the 
public hopes to realize from the proposed taking. If the property is being transferred to another private 
party, and the benefits to the public are only ‘incidental’ or ‘pretextual,’ a ‘pretext’ defense may well 
succeed.”). 
 116. Mayor of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 355 (Md. 2007) 
 117. Ehren M. Fournier, When Condemnation Precedes Compensation: Understanding the 
‘Quick Take,’ FAEGRE DRINKER (July 2, 2019), https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/public 
 
166 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:149 
immediate taking was for a public purpose.118 Thus, in the context of a 
quick-take condemnation, the Maryland Court of Appeals followed Ohio 
and Oklahoma, holding that condemnation of a property solely for  
genuine urban renewal purposes, without more, was not enough to 
constitute a public use.119 
However, in a more recent Iowa Supreme Court decision, the court 
recognized that “trickle-down benefits of economic development are not 
enough to constitute a public use,” but it still permitted takings for the 
construction of an oil pipeline.120 The court reasoned the Dakota Access 
Pipeline provided the public the benefits of cheaper and safer 
transportation of oil and lower petroleum prices.121 Further, the pipeline 
was a common carrier, which falls squarely within the second category of 
traditionally valid public uses cited by Justice O’Connor in the Kelo 
dissent.122 Thus, although other state courts used the Kelo dissent to bolster 
their opinions and distinguish the cases before them to protect property 
owners, their line of reasoning is clearly not dependable. The Iowa 
Supreme Court directly cited the decisions from Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
Maryland.123 Yet, the Iowa court approved takings for an oil pipe merely 
because an additional benefit beyond economic development existed.124 
b. Limitations and Nuance 
Because states are free to narrow restrictions on takings beyond those 
established by the United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Amendment, 
some state statutes are extremely protective. For example, in Reading Area 
Water Authority v. Schuykill River Greenway Association, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania denied condemnation of a drainage easement 
because it reasoned the sewer line at issue primarily served a private 
subdivision, even though drainage systems generally constitute a public 
use.125 In the statute conferring condemnation power, the Pennsylvania 
 
ations/2019/7/when-condemnation-precedes-compensation-understanding-the-quick-take [https://per 
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 119. Id. at 356. 
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 124. Id. at 851. For a comprehensive analysis on the issues with oil pipelines and eminent 
domain, see generally Natalie M. Jensen, Note, Eminent Domain and Oil Pipelines: A Slippery Path 
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(Pa. 2014). 
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legislature elected to prohibit all takings that would be used for any private 
enterprise.126 This statute differed from other state statutes that permitted 
an incidental private benefit. 
Further, in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Evans Development Group, LLC., 
the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the limitations on the use of 
property by a third party under the State’s eminent domain statutes.127 It 
held that the city of Salt Lake could not condemn property and exchange 
it with a public utility company.128 Under the Utah eminent domain 
statutes, the condemnor must: (1) be the party in charge of the public use 
for which the property is sought; (2) commence and complete construction 
within a reasonable time; and (3) satisfy the public use requirement on the 
specific property subject to condemnation.129 The requirements were not 
met in this case because “the City was the sole condemnor, but it was 
Rocky Mountain Power that was to be in charge of the public use of 
building and operating an electrical substation.”130 
Thus, these additional unique limitations imposed by some states 
help confine the United States Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of 
public use in those respective states. 
V. THE “NARROW-PLUS” TEST 
It is uncontested that the drafters of the Takings Clause sought to 
protect private property from sovereign takings unless the new use of 
property would benefit the public. However, the narrow view of public use 
that is most consistent with the original intent of the drafters is 
underinclusive and precludes takings that constitute a valid public use. 
This fact explains the gradual expansion of the definition of public use in 
case law. On the other hand, the broad definition impermissibly justifies 
takings that are not completely necessary for the greater good, such as 
takings for private economic development. Even in the wake of Kelo, state 
courts do not necessarily protect private property owners to the extent 
likely intended by the drafters. Therefore, a statutory fix at the federal level 
with a test for defining public use somewhere between the recognized 
narrow and broad interpretations is imperative. 
This Note’s proposal is to create a flexible “narrow-plus” federal test 
for a finding of public use. This new test will remain rooted in the narrow 
interpretation by focusing on protection from government seizure of 
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property unless the taking is assuredly for a public use. However, this Note 
proposes to add elements for determining public use based on state case 
law, which by implication includes elements of some state statutes and 
constitutions. The elements of the test will remain simple so that federal 
(and state) courts may apply it regardless of how Congress changes the 
enumerated public uses in statutes. Additionally, the test includes 
limitations taken from state law in order to prevent another broad 
interpretation of public use. 
First, all courts should continue to give deference to the legislature 
when declaring something a public use. This guideline will also allow 
Congress and state legislatures to add stricter eminent domain guidelines 
as they see fit. If a challenge to a specific taking exists, the judiciary will 
review the character and purpose of the taking. Under this new test, the 
condemnor must provide evidence to satisfy the following three prongs: 
(1) the purpose of the taking is principally for a public use; (2) the 
condemnor will oversee the construction and operation of the public use; 
and (3) the public use will definitely occur on the specific property 
acquired. To reiterate, state legislatures are free to create stricter tests or 
enumerate specific public uses. Like some of the examples above, a state 
may add restrictions, such as precluding any incidental private  
benefits or economic development plans. This test merely provides a 
baseline and starting point because what constitutes a public use  
will undoubtedly evolve.131 
The “narrow-plus” test would likely remedy the blight loophole in 
state statutes and the affordable housing issues arising under both the 
narrow and broad interpretations of public use. Blight removal would only 
be permissible if the parties could prove the first and third prongs of the 
test. If the property in question actually posed public health issues (like the 
properties in Berman and Midkiff), then it would be a permissible taking. 
However, private-to-private takings would not satisfy either requirement. 
Application of the new test to the affordable housing issue provides 
an example of the need for an interpretation of public use between the 
confines of the narrow and broad definitions. Under the new test, cities 
would be permitted to transfer property to a private party to more 
efficiently construct and operate affordable housing. Assuming statutory 
authority from the state, cities could likely produce evidence that the 
takings constitute a public use because affordable housing contributes to 
the general welfare and therefore meets the first prong. This main issue 
under the broad interpretation would be resolved because takings for 
 
 131. Stout v. City of Durham, 468 S.E.2d 254, 257 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“Whether a 
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profitable development would likely not satisfy the first prong, and 
therefore affordable housing would not have to compete with more 
lucrative projects. The second prong of the new test would be satisfied 
even if private parties assumed responsibility for affordable housing 
projects (the main issue under the narrow interpretation) because the only 
requirement is that the condemnor “oversees” the construction and 
operation of the affordable housing units. Therefore, municipalities could 
potentially hire sub-contractors and take a hands-off approach to 
supervision. Finally, assuming the affordable housing units are 
constructed on the same plot of land as the condemnation, the third prong 
would be easily met. 
CONCLUSION 
The Takings Clause is ostensibly for the protection of private 
property. However, the narrow definition of public use has evolved as a 
necessity to address modern issues. The broad definition of public use 
announced in Kelo illustrates an extreme departure from the Founding 
Fathers’ intention to limit sovereign takings. Given that eminent domain 
continues to be a vital tool for the government, gaps in the new broad 
definition of public use require a remedy. The proposed test can ultimately 
serve as a baseline federal test either at common law or enumerated in a 
statute to protect private property owners as was originally intended. 
